Typosquatted domain with a fake login page
Shortly after appearing in certificate transparency logs, the freshly registered domain began serving a copy of the organisation's login page that posted credentials to a third-party server.
An infostealer on an employee's personal device exfiltrated credentials and an active session cookie for the corporate VPN portal. The record surfaced inside a bulk sale package on a Telegram channel.
The InsightGuard approach
InsightGuard matched the URL in the log to the organisation's VPN domain and classified the record as 'employee'. The entity graph attached the other records exfiltrated from the same device to one case and flagged the session cookie as still valid.
Timeline
The employee signs in to the VPN portal from a non-corporate machine on which an infostealer had already run.
The record is shared on a Telegram channel as part of a 12,000-line stealer log package.
InsightGuard parses the package; the vpn.<org>.com.tr line matches a monitored asset and a critical-severity case is opened.
The SOC team takes the case, the password is reset and the cookie is invalidated. IOCs are pushed to the SIEM.
The case closes with the affected account scope and device quarantine note. A watch rule is left for further records from the same device.
Related files
Shortly after appearing in certificate transparency logs, the freshly registered domain began serving a copy of the organisation's login page that posted credentials to a third-party server.
The supplier's customer portal was leaked. The published dataset included API keys, webhook URLs and technical contact emails.
A subdomain left running after a marketing campaign ended stayed up on an outdated CMS version, with its panel exposed to the internet.
Next step
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