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Critical Example scenario

Employee credentials in a stealer log

An infostealer on an employee's personal device exfiltrated credentials and an active session cookie for the corporate VPN portal. The record surfaced inside a bulk sale package on a Telegram channel.

Case no
IG-UC-2026-001
Threat
A session cookie and password for the corporate VPN appeared for sale in an infostealer log.
Sectors
Banking & finance, E-commerce, Telecommunications
Roles
CISO, SOC Analyst
Modules
Compromised AssetsUnderground EconomyEntity GraphCases
Outcome
Password reset and session revocation within the first hours of publication.

The InsightGuard approach

InsightGuard matched the URL in the log to the organisation's VPN domain and classified the record as 'employee'. The entity graph attached the other records exfiltrated from the same device to one case and flagged the session cookie as still valid.

Timeline

Situation → Outcome

  1. Status T-00:00 UTC

    Personal device infected

    The employee signs in to the VPN portal from a non-corporate machine on which an infostealer had already run.

  2. Threat T+06:20 UTC

    The log enters a bulk package

    The record is shared on a Telegram channel as part of a 12,000-line stealer log package.

  3. Tespit T+06:44 UTC

    Domain match

    InsightGuard parses the package; the vpn.<org>.com.tr line matches a monitored asset and a critical-severity case is opened.

  4. Action T+07:05 UTC

    Session revocation

    The SOC team takes the case, the password is reset and the cookie is invalidated. IOCs are pushed to the SIEM.

  5. Outcome T+09:30 UTC

    Closure

    The case closes with the affected account scope and device quarantine note. A watch rule is left for further records from the same device.

Related files

IG-UC-2026-002
High Banking & finance E-commerce

Typosquatted domain with a fake login page

Shortly after appearing in certificate transparency logs, the freshly registered domain began serving a copy of the organisation's login page that posted credentials to a third-party server.

3 modules
IG-UC-2026-003
High Banking & finance Public sector

Third-party risk through a supplier breach

The supplier's customer portal was leaked. The published dataset included API keys, webhook URLs and technical contact emails.

3 modules
IG-UC-2026-004
Critical E-commerce Telecommunications

Exposed admin panel on a forgotten subdomain

A subdomain left running after a marketing campaign ended stayed up on an outdated CMS version, with its panel exposed to the internet.

3 modules

Next step

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