Employee credentials in a stealer log
An infostealer on an employee's personal device exfiltrated credentials and an active session cookie for the corporate VPN portal. The record surfaced inside a bulk sale package on …
Shortly after appearing in certificate transparency logs, the freshly registered domain began serving a copy of the organisation's login page that posted credentials to a third-party server.
The InsightGuard approach
InsightGuard continuously watches homoglyph and keyboard-adjacency variations. The domain was detected the moment it obtained a certificate; the page was visually compared to the real one and impersonation confirmed.
Timeline
A one-character variation of the corporate domain is bought from a registrar.
A free certificate is issued and a copy of the login page goes live.
The new certificate transparency entry matches the variation list and a screenshot is captured.
Requests go to the registrar and host; the domain is blocked in internal DNS and mail filtering.
The case stays open until the domain is suspended. How long that takes depends on the registrar and host; meanwhile the domain stays blocked internally and new look-alike registrations attach to the same case.
Related files
An infostealer on an employee's personal device exfiltrated credentials and an active session cookie for the corporate VPN portal. The record surfaced inside a bulk sale package on …
The supplier's customer portal was leaked. The published dataset included API keys, webhook URLs and technical contact emails.
A subdomain left running after a marketing campaign ended stayed up on an outdated CMS version, with its panel exposed to the internet.
Next step
In a 30-minute session we run a live scan against your own domains.