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High Example scenario

Typosquatted domain with a fake login page

Shortly after appearing in certificate transparency logs, the freshly registered domain began serving a copy of the organisation's login page that posted credentials to a third-party server.

Case no
IG-UC-2026-002
Threat
A one-character variation of the corporate domain was registered and served a pixel-perfect copy of the login page.
Sectors
Banking & finance, E-commerce
Roles
SOC Analyst, Brand / Legal
Modules
Phishing MonitoringTakedown ManagementCase Manager
Outcome
A takedown request was filed the same day the page went live.

The InsightGuard approach

InsightGuard continuously watches homoglyph and keyboard-adjacency variations. The domain was detected the moment it obtained a certificate; the page was visually compared to the real one and impersonation confirmed.

Timeline

Situation → Outcome

  1. Status T-02:00 UTC

    Domain registered

    A one-character variation of the corporate domain is bought from a registrar.

  2. Threat T+00:00 UTC

    Certificate and publication

    A free certificate is issued and a copy of the login page goes live.

  3. Tespit T+00:12 UTC

    CT log match

    The new certificate transparency entry matches the variation list and a screenshot is captured.

  4. Action T+01:30 UTC

    Takedown and blocking

    Requests go to the registrar and host; the domain is blocked in internal DNS and mail filtering.

  5. Outcome T+∞

    Monitoring continues

    The case stays open until the domain is suspended. How long that takes depends on the registrar and host; meanwhile the domain stays blocked internally and new look-alike registrations attach to the same case.

Related files

IG-UC-2026-001
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IG-UC-2026-003
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The supplier's customer portal was leaked. The published dataset included API keys, webhook URLs and technical contact emails.

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IG-UC-2026-004
Critical E-commerce Telecommunications

Exposed admin panel on a forgotten subdomain

A subdomain left running after a marketing campaign ended stayed up on an outdated CMS version, with its panel exposed to the internet.

3 modules

Next step

What shows up on your own surface?

In a 30-minute session we run a live scan against your own domains.